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Abstract
Motivated by the credit crisis 2007-08, this paper presents a theory of "capital market banks"; banks
that use derivative programs to exploit ine¢ ciencies in the capital markets. I model banks use of
asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs as a local game, and analyse how these programs
a¤ect nancial stability. In a nancial market where banks are subject to costly capital requirements
and investors are heterogeneous, the ABCP program arises endogenously in response to ine¢ cient risk
sharing. The sustainability of the ABCP program depends crucially on the sponsoring banks capital.
Small shocks to the banks capital can lead to a failure of the ABCP program. This amplies the shock
and pushes the the bank into bankruptcy. I link the dynamics of the ABCP market to the interbank
market, and argue that an unravelling of the ABCP market can cause a seizure of the interbank market.
The model indicates, that traditional monetary policy is unable to alleviate seizures of the interbank
market, but that targeted liquidity measures, such as the "Term Securities Lending Facility", the "Term
Auction Facility", the "Troubled Asset Relief Program", the "Money Market ABCP Program" and the
launch of a "super fund", could end the unravelling of the ABCP market and ease the pressures in the
interbank market.
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1 Introduction
The conditions in the nancial markets during 2007 and 2008 may well be characterised as the most
tumultuous since the great depression of the 1930s. An increase in the default rates on US subprime
mortgages in early 2007, a tiny market relative to the global capital markets, had by August 2008 led
to the rst bank run in more than 100 years in the United Kingdom, brought Bear Stearns, Merril
Lynch and Wachovia Bank to the brink of default, lead to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
resulted in the recapitalisation of several of the German landesbanks by the German state bank,
and imposed close to USD 1000bn of losses on the banks from the developed economies.1 How
could problems in a corner of the nancial market have such a ferocious impact on the state of the
nancial system at a time of otherwise high and stable growth? Much evidence points to modern
banks growing dependence on the capital markets and complex derivative programs as an integrated
part of their daily business. Northern Rock, the stricken UK mortgage lender, was heavily reliant
on the ability to securitize its assets, and the recapitalisations of the German landesbanks were
caused by their failure to renance their asset backed commercial paper programs.
In the extant literature, banks are modelled as simple entities that take deposits and extend
loans. Their balance sheets are static, and their loan portfolios are held until maturity (Diamond
and Dybvig (1983)). In these frameworks, the nancial intermediaries have no use for the capital
markets, and the banks and the capital markets are treated as competing sources of nance (Jacklin
(1987), Diamond (1997), Allen and Gale Allen and Gale (1997), Boot and Thakor (2001)). The
current turmoil has assigned a preeminent role to the interaction between the banks and capital
markets through the banksuse of derivative programs. Thus, to understand why problems in the
US subprime market could bring the nancial system to its knees, we need a theory that explains
modern banks use of derivative programs, and which highlights how a seemingly small event,
through these programs, can propagate and destabilise the nancial system.
This paper presents a theory of modern nancial intermediation, and illustrates modern banks,
"capital market banks", increasing reliance on derivative programs as an integrated part of their
1Bloomberg.
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business. In existing theories, banks arise as an e¢ cient mechanism to resolve complex contracting
problems. Banks are viewed either as an insurance mechanism which, through an intertemporal
transfer of cash ows, enhances risk sharing among consumers (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) and
rms (Holmström and Tirole (1998)), or as a mechanism to resolve agency problems arising from
information processing (Diamond (1984)). In contrast, the primary role of the capital market banks
is not to engage in intertemporal transfers, nor to alleviate information processing problems. The
capital market banks exploit derivative programs to dissect the risk of a stream of cash ows, and
structure securities which meet specic regulatory requirements or ll the demand of a specic
group of investors. By customizing the securities and distributing the risks to those best suited to
carry them given the regulatory environment, capital market banks enhance risk sharing.
One of the derivative programs which have attracted particular attention is the asset backed
securities (ABCP) program (See Brunnermeier (2009), Fitch Ratings (2007) or Taylor and Williams
(2008)). Attention has turned to this segment of the capital market, due to the astronomical size
of the programs and the speed with which they have been unravelling. In July 2007, the size of
the ABCP market was USD 1.2trn, and in May 2008, the market had contracted to USD 700bn
(Fitch Ratings (2008)). In parallel with this contraction, banks stopped lending to each other in the
interbank markets. In the public debate, the seizure of the interbank markets has been attributed
directly to the unravelling of the ABCP market.2 In more rigorous empirical work, Taylor and
Williams (2008) nd, that the main factors explaining the development in the interbank market
during 2007-08 was the credit spread on senior bank debt and the banks exposure to ABCP
programs. Despite the suggested link between the ABCP market and the interbank market, no
theory has been put forward to expose the exact mechanism that links the two markets. This paper
suggests one theory of how a small shock to the bankscapital, such as a shock to the US subprime
mortgage market, can lead to an unravelling of the ABCP market, and thereby be amplied to
create a seizure of the interbank markets. Importantly, by identifying the underlying cause of the
seizure of the interbank market, the model provides a framework against which the public and
2See for example IMF (2008).
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private sectors responses to the development in the interbank markets can be evaluated.
Last, by exposing the vulnerability in the structure of the ABCP programs, the paper contributes
to the ongoing debate among practitioners about how the seemingly riskless ABCP market could
grind to a sudden halt.2 The model of the ABCP market presented in this paper, illustrates that
the vulnerability of the ABCP programs derives from losses that occur if the programs are forced
into a re-sale of their assets. Thus, contrary to popular beliefs (see footnote 2), an unwind of the
ABCP market can occur even if the sponsoring banks capital is adequate to shoulder the potential
losses from the assets held in the program.
The main idea in the model is as follows. Consider a nancial market with two types of agents,
risk neutral banks and risk averse investors. Optimal risk sharing requires the banks to own the risky
assets, but, due to minimum capital requirements, the bankscost of funds exceeds the investors
cost of funds. When the cost of capital is su¢ ciently high, the risk averse investors become the
most competitive buyers of the risky assets, and the market price of the assets incorporates a risk
premium. To circumvent the ine¢ cient asset allocation, the banks sponsor ABCP programs. Under
the ABCP program, a special investment vehicle (SIV) issues short-term liabilities (ABCP) to the
risk averse investors and uses the proceeds to purchase risky assets. Through a series of derivative
contracts, the risk of the assets is passed on to the bank. The ABCP program is structured such
that the banksregulatory capital requirement under the derivatives contracts are zero. By passing
the risk of the assets on to the bank, the SIV reduces the risk of the ABCP which is owned by
the risk averse investors. Thus, the ABCP program improves risk sharing and is protable to the
banks as they acquire the risk of the assets at a price which incorporates a risk premium.
As an important feature of the equilibrium, the ABCP programs can amplify small shocks to
the banksstock capital and increase the vulnerability of the nancial system. Initially, the ABCP
2The practitionersconfusion about the cause of the unravelling of the ABCP market, is captured well by the following quote
from Fitch Ratings, "...Not all RMBS/CDO exposures are subprime-related, and the complete seizure of the ABCP market,
in Fitchs opinion, is an extreme over-reaction by investors. It also reects the fact that investors may not have placed much
reliance on fundamental analysis of the structure of the conduit, particularly how liquidity lines and credit enhancement work
in the event of a market disruption. If the underlying US Subprime RMBS assets in conduits default, banks, as providers of
credit enhancement lines, may need to absorb these losses up to the committed amount of the credit enhancement facility. Most
banks, with the exception of a few, have robust balance sheets and are well placed to absorb these losses for the amount of their
commitment." (Fitch Ratings (2007)).
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programs enhance risk sharing and lead to a contraction of the risk premium. Under the derivative
contracts, if the SIV fails to renance the ABCP, the sponsoring bank is obliged to purchase the
SIVs assets. This purchase is executed at a price which ensures full repayment of the ABCP
investors, and not at the price at which the assets can be sold in the market. When the SIVs assets
are brought on to the banks balance sheet, they become subject to the capital requirement which
renders it ine¢ cient for the bank to hold the assets. This leads to a re-sale of the assets, and,
since the only buyers of the assets are the risk averse investors, a surge in the risk premium and a
loss to the bank.
This is the ABCP programs Achilles heal. Consider the behaviour of an investor who contem-
plates investing either in ABCP or in a risk-free asset. If the investor believes that the SIV can
renance the ABCP in the subsequent period, it is optimal for the investor to invest in ABCP.
However, if the investor believes that the SIV will fail to renance the ABCP in the subsequent
period, and if the sponsoring banks capital is insu¢ cient to shoulder the losses from the re-sale,
the ABCP investor will not be repaid in full and therefore will not invest in the ABCP. Although
this suggests that the model exhibits multiple equilibria, with a beliefs determined equilibrium
selection, the specic structure of the model, a local game, ensures the existence of a unique equi-
librium.3 In this equilibrium, the investors employ a trigger strategy and renance the SIV only
if the sponsoring banks capital exceeds a specic threshold. Consequently, a small shock to the
sponsoring banks capital can push it below the renancing threshold, and can lead to an unwind
of the ABCP program. The idea that a small change in fundamentals can lead to a re-sale of
the risky assets has some similarities with the mechanism explored in Morris and Shin (2004). As
in Morris and Shin (2004), the re-sale arises due to a coordination problem and the risk averse
investorsdownward sloping demand curve.4
The sponsoring banks stock of capital is important to the investors, because it determines the
3See for example Morris and Shin (2003) for an extensive survey of the literature on the unique equilibrium of local and
global games.
4Despite this similarity, the model presented in Morris and Shin (2004) di¤er from the model presented here both in objective
and modelling methodology. Morris and Shin use a global game with imperfect information, to analyse the importance of model
based risk management for the liquidity of securities markets.
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banks ability to withstand a re-sale of the assets from the ABCP program. This suggests, that
when the potential losses from a re-sale are large, the ABCP program can fail to be renanced
even if the sponsoring banks capital is su¢ cient to shoulder the potential losses from the assets.
The liquidation of the ABCP program pushes the sponsoring bank into bankruptcy. This pro-
vides the link between the ABCP market and developments in the interbank market. As suggested
by Taylor and Williams (2008), the model attributes the seizure of the interbank market to concerns
about counterparty risk. In the model, short-term liquidity is plentiful, but seizures of the inter-
bank market arise when the banks attempt to obtain loans which mature post the renancing of
the ABCP programs. The model predicts, that the market for long-term interbank credit remains
open only to banks with adequate capital relative to the size of their ABCP programs.
An important contribution of the model is to uncover a link between the ABCP programs
through which the failure of one program, in a contagious fashion, can lead to the failure of other
programs. When the banks are heterogeneous with respect to their stock of capital, a shock to the
bankscapital may initially force one bank to liquidate its ABCP program. All the ABCP programs
hold the same risky assets, so the subsequent re-sale creates an externality for the remaining
programs. By reducing the price at which the remaining programs can be liquidated, the failure of
one program reduces the expected return on ABCP and impairs the investorsincentives to renance
the other programs. In turn, this can force other programs into liquidation and lead to additional
re-sales. This contagion is akin to the forced selling mechanism explored in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2005). Brunnermeier and Pedersen analyse the strategic interaction between traders in
the nancial market, and illustrate that when agents are subject to credit constraints, the asset
sales of one trader can have an adverse price impact which turns other traders into forced sellers.
The model provides a setting in which the public and private sectors responses to the credit
crisis of 2007-08 can be evaluated. In the model, traditional monetary policy, interest rate cuts
and injection of short-term liquidity, is ine¤ective in alleviating the seizure of the interbank market
and the unravelling of the ABCP market. This is so, since the fundamental problem is a shortage
capital, and not a lack of short-term liquidity. In contrast, the model suggests that the central banks
6
targeted liquidity measures, the Term Auction Facility and the Term Securities Lending Facility,
can ease the seizure of the interbank market and alleviate the pressure for banks to liquidate their
ABCP programs. By allowing distressed banks to repo the risky assets from the ABCP program, the
central bank provides the banks with an alternative to the re-sales. However, for these measures
to be e¢ cient, it is a prerequisite that the central bank is willing to supply more liquidity under the
repo transactions than the banks could have obtained from the re-sale, i.e. it requires the central
bank to take risk.
The private sectors initiative, the super fund, corresponds to an insurance mechanism under
which the banks pool their capital to support the ABCP programs. This mechanism involves a
cross pledging of capital, under which banks with excess capital pledge capital to banks with a
capital decit. The model suggests, that this mechanism could have halted the unravelling of the
ABCP market by improving the resilience of the most vulnerable banks.
The theory presented in this paper is related to the literature which analyses the interaction
between nancial intermediaries and the capital market. This literature nds, that the bilateral
nature of bank nance and banksability to monitor borrowers implies that bank nance is better
when moral hazard problems are severe (Diamond (1991), Holmström and Tirole (1997), Boot and
Thakor (1997)) or when R&D and project development is costly (Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)).
Capital maket nance is superior when borrowers face soft budget constraints (Dewatripont and
Mashkin (1995)) or when projects are subject to diversity of oppinion (Allen and Gale (1999)). As
a common trait, this literature models the banks and the capital markets as competing sources of
nance. The banks do not rely on the capital market as an integrated part of their business and the
capital market expands at the expence of bank nance (and vice versa). In contrast, it the model
presented below the ability to transact in the capital market is at the core of the capital market
banksbusiness model. Further, the theoretical framework does not emphasize the bilateral nature
of bank-borrower relationships or the banksability to monitor borrowers.
Closely related to the work presented in this paper is Song and Thakor (2007) and Allen and
Gale (1997). Song and Thakor illustrate that banks can reduce their cost of funds by securitizing
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their loan portfolio and selling it in the capital market. Thus, as in the model presented in this
paper, Song and Thakor emphasise that the ability to transact in the capital markets is an integral
part of modern banksbusiness. In contrast with Song and Thakors work, in the model presented
below the banksdesire to transact in the capital market arises not out of a need to reduce the cost
of funds, but to circumvent ine¢ cient cross-sectional risk sharing. Also related is Allen and Gale
(1997) which illustrates that banks are better at intertemporal risk sharing whereas the capital
markets are superior in cross-sectional risk sharing. The capital market banks presented in the
model below transact in the capital markets exactly to enhance their ability to engage in cross-
sectional risk sharing.
This paper complements the literature on the economic implications of coordination problems.5
The notion that coordination problems eliminate multiple equilibria is well developed in the global
game models. In these games, agents face strategic uncertainty and in equilibrium they employ
trigger strategies which cause the outcome of the game to change as the models fundamentals
breaches a specic threshold. Consequently, small changes in fundamentals can have a signicant
impact on asset prices (Morris and Shin (2004), Plantin and Shin (2008)) and nancial stability
(Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)). The model presented below is a
local game, and the structure of the model is most closely related to Oyama (2004). Oyama
illustrates, that intertemporal strategic uncertainty can create a coordination problem and lead
to path dependent FDIs. In the model presented below, the intertemporal strategic uncertainty
arises as the return to ABCP investors in period t depends on the actions of the investors at time
t+1. In addition to the di¤erence in objective, the model presented in this paper embeds and asset
pricing framework into the local game, and allows for a contemporaneous link between the ABCP
programs through which shocks can spill from one nancial intermediary to another.
The paper is also related to the work in Allen and Gale (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) on
the micro foundations of nancial contagion. Similar to Diamond and Rajan (2005), ex ante there
are no links between the banks and the transmission of a shock from one nancial intermediary
5See Morris and Shin (2003) for an outstanding survey of this literature.
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to another arises endogeneously through the asset market. Diamond and Rajan (2005) focus on
liquidity shocks, and illustrate how these can be transmitted through the interbank market. In the
model below, the shock a¤ects the banksstock of capital and the shock is amplied and transferred
through the ABCP market. The shock only a¤ects the banksaccess to liquidity through its impact
on the their solvency.
The paper proceeds as follows. To illustrate the capital market banksbusiness model and to
develop a banckdrop for the theorecial model, section 2 contains a detailed description of the generic
structure of an ABCP program. Section 3 presents the baseline model which leads to ine¢ cient
risk sharing. Section 4 contains the body of the analysis. This section illustrates how the capital
market banks prot from ine¢ ciencies in the nancial markets and exposes the vulnerability of the
ABCP programs. Section 5 ties the link between the interbank market and the ABCP market, and
section 6 evaluates the public and private sectors responses to the credit crisis. Section 7 contains
a detailed discussion of the contagion mechanism and section 8 concludes.
To preserve continuity, all proofs have been related to the Appendix.
2 Structure of an asset backed commercial paper program
Financial intermediaries which are subject to capital requirements, use ABCP programs to raise
secured nancing of specic assets. Under the ABCP program, the nancial intermediary retains
the risk of the assets and, since the structure of the ABCP program reduces the capital requirement
to zero, it is a particularly compelling source of nance when the cost of capital is high.
To initiate an ABCP program, the bank sets up a SIV which raises nance by issuing short-term
liabilities (ABCP). The proceeds from the issuance are invested in risky assets in compliance with
a set of investment guidelines. Typically, the guidelines impose a lower bound on the credit quality
of the assets through a requirement on the assetscredit rating.6 If any of the assets held by the
SIV slip below the minimum requirement, the SIV is obliged to dispose of the assets.
6The ratings requirement depends on the details and rating of the program, but are generally quite strict as the SIV is
typically not allowed to hold securites with a credit rating below AAA.
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The SIV enters into a set of derivative contracts with the sponsoring bank; a liquidity facility,
a credit facility and a swap agreement. The objective of these contracts is to eliminate the SIVs
exposure to the risk of the assets. Under the swap agreement, the SIV pays the cash ows received
under the assets minus its operating costs against receiving the interest due under the ABCP. Under
the credit facility, the sponsoring bank receives a fee against the promise to reimburse the SIV for
potential losses on the assets. Typically, the credit facility is subject to a collateral agreement
which requires the bank to post collateral if the market value of the SIVs assets drop. Under the
liquidity facility, the sponsoring bank receives a fee against the promise to renance the SIV if the
ABCP cannot be renanced in the market. The liquidity facility can take several forms as the
sponsoring bank can either purchase the assets held by the SIV or purchase the maturing ABCP.
The net e¤ect of the derivatives contracts is that ABCP investors are secured by the assets held
by the SIV and by the credit facility with the sponsoring bank. In addition, the liquidity facility
eliminates the risk that the SIV fails to repay ABCP investors due to illiquidity of the ABCP
market. The short tenure of the ABCP reduces the risk that the credit quality of the derivative
counterparties deteriorate prior to the maturity of the ABCP. Finally, if one of the counterparties
to the derivative transactions is pushed into bankruptcy, the SIV automatically makes the largest
possible drawdown under the liquidity facility.
Despite the potentially long tenure of the assets held by the SIV, the stated maturity of the credit
and liquidity facility is less than one year (typically 364 days). As the facilities roll to maturity,
the original counterparties must declare whether they are interested in renewing the facilities. This
declaration must be made some period, say X days, prior to the maturity of the facilities. If the
counterparties refuse to enter into new facilities, the SIV is instructed to draw liquidity equal to the
notional amount of its outstanding ABCP under the liquidity facility. The notice period for this
drawdown is Y days, where Y < X. This structure ensures, that if the derivative counterparties
refuse to renew the facilities, then the SIV obtains enough liquidity to redeem the outstanding
ABCP from the liquidity facility. In e¤ect, this leads to an evergreening of the facilities. The
original tenure of the credit and liquidity facility is less than one year, so they receive preferential
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regulatory treatment. In particular, undrawn committed facilities with an original tenure of less
than one year is subject to a capital requirement of 0% (FSA (2001)). The economic outcome of
this structure is, that ABCP investors provide low risk nance to the SIV, whilst the derivative
counterparties own the risk of the assets.
3 The model
The model has an innite number of periods and three types of agents; banks, long-term investors
and short-term investors. There are N innitely lived risk neutral banks and a measure 1 of each
type of investor. Short-term investors live for one period and long-term investors live for n periods.
To obtain pleasant convergence properties, I assume that n is large. Upon his death, each investor
is replaced by a new investor with similar characteristics. The investors derive utility only from
their terminal wealth and the utility of an investor living until time  is given by,
Ut (W ) =

0 if t 6= 
  exp ( W ) for t =  ,
where W is the investorswealth at time  , and  is the common constant absolute risk aversion
coe¢ cient. Both types of investors are born without endowments and raise nance at the interest
rate rI which is normalized to zero.
The two types of investors are introduced to capture institutional features of the capital markets.
The short-term investors is a modelling abstraction for the money market funds and the long-
term investors represents strategic investors with longer investment horizons (typically pension and
insurance funds). I take the existence of these investor classes as given, and assume that long-term
investors can only hold assets with an original tenure of more than one period and that short-term
investors can only hold assets with an original tenure of one period.7,8
The banks are nanced by deposits which are insured by a deposit insurance fund, and they
are subject to capital requirements which require them to hold k units of capital for each unit of
7A theoretical rationale for the optimality of constraining investors to particular market segments falls outside the scope of
this paper but is provided in He and Xiong (2008), Dewatripont et. al (1999) or Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
8The constraint on the investorsallocations implies that the portfolio allocation of the long-term investor is independent of
the portfolio allocation of the short-term investor. This simplies the analysis and permits closed form solutions.
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deposits they raise. The banks are liquidated if they fail to meet this requirement. At time t, bank
i uses its stock of deposits, Dit, and its stock of capital, 
i
t, to nance its operations. The absolute
return from bank is operations are at time t+ 1 given by itre +D
i
trD + ~"t where rD is the banks
deposit rate, re is the banks cost of capital and ~"t is a random variable which is realized at the end
of period t (just prior to time t + 1).9 ~"t has two equally likely outcomes, ~"t 2 f "; "g. At time
zero, the banksstock of capital is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distribution function
G () and support [0;1).
At each point in time, the economy has two risk-free assets which di¤er only with respect to
their maturity. The risk-free assets yield the risk-free rate of return which has been normalised
to zero, and have an original maturity of respectively 1 and n periods. The risk-free assets are in
perfectly elastic supply, and are upon their maturity replaced by new risk-free assets with similar
characteristics. In addition to the risk-free assets, the economy has n risky assets. Each risky
asset has a tenure of n periods and is in supply S. The maturity of the risky assets is staggered
such that, out of the n assets outstanding at time t, there is exactly one asset with j periods to
maturity for j = f1; 2; :::; ng. Upon maturity, each risky asset is replaced by a new asset with
similar characteristics. In period t (just prior to time t + 1), each risky asset pays a dividend of
~rt 2 f r; rg, r > 0, where each outcome is equally likely. In addition, the risky asset pays the
non-stochastic cash ow 1 at maturity. I assume that ~"t and ~rt are independent, and both variables
are serially uncorrelated.10
4 Analysis
The subsequent analysis is split into three sections. In the rst section, I analyse the equilibrium
prior to the introduction of the ABCP program. This section illustrates how the regulatory capital
requirement leads to ine¢ cient risk sharing and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of the ABCP
9This specication ensures that the net return from the banksoperations is a random variable with a mean of zero. The
models qualitative conclusions are invariant to alternative specications under which the bankshave positive expected prots
from their operations. Under these alternative specication, the banksprots can be interpreted as the information rents which
traditionally justies the existence of banks.
10This assumption is not crucial to the models qualitative conclusions but it simplies the exposition.
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program. The second section models the ABCP program, and the third section illustrates that the
banks can improve risk sharing and raise their prots by sponsoring ABCP programs.
4.1 Equilibrium without ABCP program
There is a deposit insurance so the supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at rD = 0. At time t,
bank is weighted average cost of capital riwacc;t is therefore
riwacc;t =
it
it +D
i
t
re  kre. (1)
Let the price of the risky asset with j periods to maturity be given by P Ij when the investors
own the entire stock of the risky asset, and by P i;Bt;j if bank i, at time t, owns the entire stock of
the risky asset.
Lemma 1 If the risky assets are held entirely by the investors, then the price of the risky asset
with j periods until maturity is given by,
P Ij = 1  2jS,
where 2j = jr
2 is the variance of the asset with j periods until maturity.
The banks are risk neutral so since Et (~rs) = 0 for s > t, it follows that
P i;Bt;j = Et
"
jQ
s=1
 
1 + riwacc;t+s
# 1  1
(1 + kre)
j
,
where the inequality follows from (1).11 Let, PBj  1(1+kre)j . The investors are the most competitive
bidders for the risky asset if P Ij > P
B
j . This condition is fullled if,
re >
1
k
"
1
1  jr2S
 1
j
  1
#
: (2)
The right hand side of condition (2) is increasing in j, so a su¢ cient condition for P Ij > P
B
j is
re  1
k
"
1
1  nr2S
 1
n
  1
#
: (3)
Throughout the analysis, I assume that condition (3) is fullled.
11Since ~rt is an i.i.d. variable and it determined prior to ~rt, it follows that Et
h
~rs
1+rwacc;t+s
i
= 0.
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Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the price of the risky asset with j periods to maturity is given by P Ij
and the stock of risky assets is held entirely by the long-term investors. The short-term investors
invest only in the short-term risk-free asset. The banks allocate their capital and deposits to their
operations and obtain zero expected prots.
Under condition (3) the banks refrain from investing in the risky assets. Although optimal
risk sharing requires the banks to own the risky assets, the combination of a high cost of capital
and the regulatory capital requirement implies, that the risk averse long-term investor is the most
competitive bidder for the risky assets. The banks can enhance risk sharing and increase their
prots by sponsoring ABCP programs. The following section describes the modelling of the ABCP
program.
4.2 The ABCP program
To initiate an ABCP program, bank i enters into a swap agreement and a liquidity/credit facility
(the "facility") with a SIV.12 At time t, the SIV sponsored by bank i issues liabilities (ABCP) with
a tenure of one period and an interest rate of ricp;t  rcp
 
it

. The proceeds from the issuance are
invested in risky assets at the prevailing market price. At time t, the market price of the risky asset
with j periods to maturity is given by P cpj . At each point in time, the SIV renances the maturing
ABCP by issuing new ABCP. Under the swap agreement, the bank receives the return from the
assets held by the SIV and pays the interest due under the ABCP. I assume, that the notional
amount of each ABCP program is exogenously xed at A, and that each SIV acquires a notional
amount of An of each of the risky assets. Let the issue price of the ABCP (per unit of notional
amount) be given by I. To ensure that the ABCP program is fully collateralised, the issue price of
the ABCP is equal to the average price of the assets held by the SIV, that is
I =
1
n
nP
j=1
P cpj .
Under the swap agreement, the sponsoring bank receives a net cash ow of,
~rt   ricp;t

A.
12To keep the analysis simple, I assume that the ABCP program has one combined credit and liquidity facility.
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Under the facility, the bank provides liquidity to the SIV if this fails to renance its maturing
ABCP. To provide this liquidity, the bank acquires the SIVs assets at the price which ensures full
repayment of the maturing ABCP. If at any point the sponsoring bank is forced into liquidation,
the SIV immediately makes the largest possible drawdown under the facility and liquidates its
remaining assets (if any). The proceeds from this procedure are used to redeem outstanding ABCP
as this matures. The fee for the facility is set to ensure that the net cash ows to the SIV are zero.
The ABCP is redeemed at the price at which it was issued, so the fee for the facility corresponds
to the change in the price of the assets held by the SIV.13 Thus, at time t, the fee for the facility
is given by,
A
24 1
n
n 1X
j=0
P cpj   I
35 = A
n
(P cp0   P cpn ) .
The fee for the facility is consumed immediately by the bank, so the dynamics of the banks capital
is given by,14
it+1 = 
i
t +

~rt   ricp;t

A+ ~"t. (4)
Lastly, I impose the constraint that the volatility of the banks operations is large relative to the
volatility of the assets held in the ABCP program, " > rA.15
With the modelling of the ABCP program in hand, I turn to the equilibrium analysis.
4.3 Equilibrium with ABCP program
In the following, I derive the equilibrium under the assumption that it is optimal for the banks to
sponsor the ABCP programs. Lemma 9 veries that this is indeed the case.
Given the CARA utility function, the long-term investorsdemand for the risky asset with j
13 If this price change is negative, the fee for the facility captures that the sponsoring bank must transfer additional collateral
to the SIV under the credit facility.
14The banksconsumption takes the form of wages to employees and distributions to shareholders.
15This assumption permits a ranking of the bankslevel of capital following various relisations of ~"t and ~rt. In particular, it
implies that the bankscapital is higher if (~"t; ~rt) = ("; r) than if (~"t; ~rt) = ( "; r). The signicance of the assumption is only
that it allows a ranking of banks capital following di¤erent realisations of the random variables. All the models qualitative
results prevail with the alternative assumption "  rA. Given the investment guidelines imposed on the SIV, it appears
appropriate to assume that the variance of the assets held by the SIV is low relative to the variance of the revenues from the
banksoperations.
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periods to maturity is given by
1 P cpj
2j
.16 The SIVs demand N An of each of the risky assets, so
market clearing requires,
1  P cpj
2j
+N
A
n
= S,
which implies,
P cpj = 1  2j

S  NA
n

.
The ABCP programs permit short-term investors to participate in the nancing of the risky
assets. This raises the demand for the risky assets which, through a contraction of the risk premium,
leads to a surge in the price of the risky assets, i.e. PCPj > P
I
j .
The analysis of the ABCP program and the behaviour of short-term investors proceeds in four
steps. In the rst step, I note that the return on ABCP depends on the renancing of the ABCP
in the subsequent period. The second step illustrates that the sponsoring bank may incur a loss if
it is forced to renance the ABCP under the facility. Step three shows the potential for multiple
equilibria, and the nal step exploits that the game is a local game and derives a the unique
equilibrium strategy for short-term investors.
Consider an investor that at time t invests AI into an ABCP program sponsored by bank i.
Given the price of the ABCP, the notional amount of the investment is A. If the SIV renances
the ABCP at time t+ 1 (either through the market or through the facility) the ABCP investor is
repaid
 
I + ricp;t

A and obtains utility,17
Ut+1 (Wt+1) =   exp
   I + ricp;tA .
If the SIV fails to renance the ABCP at time t+1, an event that occurs only if bank i is pushed
into bankruptcy when it is required to meet its obligations under the facility, the SIV obtains as
much liquidity from the bank as possible and thereafter liquidates its remaining assets. This gives
the ABCP investor a repayment of
it+1 +
A
n
n 1P
j=0
P u;ij ,
16See the proof of Lemma 1 for details.
17The term ABCP investors refer to short-term investors who have invested in ABCP.
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where P u;ij is the price of the risky asset with j periods until maturity contingent on the unwind of
bank is ABCP program. Thus, if the ABCP is not renanced, the ABCP investor obtains a utility
of,
Ut+1 (Wt+1) =   exp
"
 
 
it+1 +
A
n
n 1P
j=0
P u;ij
!#
.
Clearly, if the sponsoring bank fails to meets its obligations under the facility, the ABCP in-
vestors are not repaid in full, so
  exp    I + ricp;tA >   exp
"
 
 
it+1 +
A
n
n 1P
j=0
P u;ij
!#
.
The second step in the analysis illustrates, that the sponsoring bank may incur a loss if it is
forced to renance its SIV under the facility. To ensure full repayment of the ABCP investors, the
bank must pay I for the SIVsassets if it renances the SIV under the facility. The purchase price
of each asset, is not set on market terms, but is set to ensure that the SIV can redeem the maturing
ABCP. If bank i is the only bank to provide liquidity to its SIV, it can subsequently sell the assets
for,
P u;ij = 1  2j

S   (N   1) A
n

.
Since P u;ij > P
I
j > P
B
j for all j, it is optimal for the bank to sell the risky assets.
Let L be bank is prots from renancing its SIV under the facility. Then,
L = A
"
1
n
n 1P
j=0
P u;ij   I
#
=
A
n
n 1P
j=0

P u;ij   P cpj

+A
"
1
n
n 1P
j=0
P cpj   I
#
=
A
n
n 1P
j=0

P u;ij   P cpj

+
A
n
(P cp0   P cpn ) .
The rst term in this expression is bank is loss from acquiring the risky assets from the SIV. The
second term is the gain that accrues to the bank as a fee under the facility. This fee corresponds to
the contraction in the risk premium that occurs over one period. Lemma 3 lists the condition under
which the loss from the rst term exceeds the gains from the second term. Under this condition,
the renancing of the ABCP program leads to a loss.
17
Lemma 3 If bank i is the only bank to provide liquidity to its ABCP program and
S <
A
n
 
n 1P
j=0
j +N
!
, (5)
then bank i incurs a prot of L, where
L = Ar2
"
S   A
n
 
n 1P
j=0
j
n
+N
!#
< 0.
Throughout the analysis, I assume that condition (5) is fullled.
The third step of the analysis illustrates, that under condition (5), the short-term investors
willingness to renance the SIV at time t depends both on the sponsoring banks capital, and on
the expected behaviour of the short-term investors at time t+1. The state space can be partitioned
into three sets. If it      for some  ! 0,  > 0, the sponsoring bank is certain to violate the
minimum capital requirement. This implies, that the sponsoring bank and the ABCP program are
liquidated independent of the behaviour of the short-term investors at time t+ 1. This leaves the
ABCP investors with recourse to the risky assets. Condition (5) implies that L < 0, so
  exp
24 
0@A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1A35 <   exp [ IA] .
Thus, for it  , the dominant action for short-term investors is to invest in the risk-free asset.
Conversely, for t    L + , the sponsoring bank has su¢ cient capital to meet its obligations
under the facility, so ABCP investors are certain to receive repayment of at least their investment.
Consequently, their dominant action is to renance the SIV independent of the behaviour of the
short-term investors at time t+ 1.
For  < it < , the short-term investorsdominant action varies as a function of their beliefs.
This suggests, that the ABCP program exhibits multiple equilibria with a beliefs determined equi-
librium selection. To see this, let pt be the likelihood that short-term investors at time t attach to
a renancing of the SIV at time t+ 1, i.e. pt is the short-term investorsbeliefs about the actions
of the short-term investors in the subsequent period. Then, the expected utility from investing in
ABCP is given by,
Et [U (Wt+1)] =  pt exp
   I + ricp;tA  (1  pt)Et
8<:exp
24 
0@t+1 + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1A359=; .
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If pt = 1, it is optimal for the short-term investors to renance the SIV. Conversely if pt = 0, it
is optimal for short-term investors to refrain from renancing the SIV. Although this suggests the
occurrence of multiple equilibria, the game is a local game where the short-term investorsoptimal
behaviour is determined uniquely as a function of the sponsoring banksequity.
Based on these observations, Lemma 4 lists the necessary conditions for short term investors to
renance the SIV.
Lemma 4 There is a unique value of it, 
i;, such that short-term investors renance the SIV
sponsored by bank i only if it  i;.
The result in Lemma 4 is derived by iterated deletion of conditionally dominated strategies.
The proof veries, that if there is only one bank in the economy, there is only one strategy which
survives this procedure, and therefore the model has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the short-term investors employ a trigger strategy and renance the SIV if and only if
the sponsoring banks capital exceeds a given threshold. However, when there are multiple banks
in the economy, the failure to renance one SIV may lead to the failure to renance other SIVs.
Thus, Lemma 4 yields only the necessary conditions for short-term investors to renance the SIV.
The logic behind the switching strategy is driven by three features of the ABCP program:
1. Strict dominance regions: The existence of values for it,  and , such that short-term
investors have strictly dominant strategies for it =2
 
; 

,
2. Strategic complementarity: For it 2
 
; 

, the return to renancing the SIV at time t
is strictly higher if short-term investors renance the SIV at time t + 1 than if short-term
investors refuse to renance the SIV at time t+ 1, and
3. Strict monotonicity: For it 2
 
; 

, the expected utility from renancing the SIV is strictly
increasing in it.
The rst feature ensures the existence of ranges of fundamentals for which the short-term in-
vestorsoptimal action is independent of the action of the short-term investors in the subsequent
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period. These regions anchor the behaviour of the short-term investors when it 2
 
; 

. The
second feature ensures, that short-term investors, post observing a it "su¢ ciently close" to 
i
(i), maximize their expected utility by selecting the action which is dominant in the region above
(below) 
i
(i). The third feature ensures the existence of a unique value of it, 
i;, such that
"su¢ ciently close" to 
i
(i) implies it  i; (it < i;).
One important insight of Lemma 4 is, that the ability to renance the ABCP program depends
on the sponsoring banks stock of capital, and not on the quality of the assets held in the program.
Thus, Lemma 4 illustrates, that a failure to renance the SIV can occur without a deterioration in
the credit quality of the assets held by the SIV. In the framework presented here, the quality of the
risky assets is invariant over time, and the losses which lead to the failure of the ABCP program
arise from the re-sale of the SIVs assets.
In the following, I assume that all banks have the ability to launch an ABCP program at time
0, i.e. 0  i; for all i.
When the stock of capital varies across the banks, the threshold at which one ABCP program is
liquidated di¤ers from the threshold at which other ABCP programs are liquidated, i.e. i; 6= l;
for i 6= l. Lemma 5 shows that there is an important interconnectedness across the ABCP programs.
The source of this interconnectedness is, that the ABCP programs are invested into the same risky
assets. This implies, that the failure to renance one ABCP program, in a contagious fashion, can
trigger a failure to renance other ABCP programs.
Lemma 5 Short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by bank i only if they renance the
SIV sponsored by bank l for all i; l such that i0  l0.
Lemma 5 contains two insights. First, it illustrates, that the resilience of the ABCP program is
increasing in the sponsoring banks stock of capital.18 An increase in the sponsoring banks stock
of capital raises the repayment to the ABCP investor when the SIV is renanced under the facility.
Thus, for any given interest rate on the ABCP, a higher level of capital (weakly) raises the expected
18The statement in the lemma refers to the banksstock of capital at time 0. However, the shocks to the bankscapital are
uniform across the banks. Thus, the ordering of the banks according to their stock of capital at time 0 is equivalent to the
ordering of the banks according to their stock of capital at time t.
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return on ABCP and enhances the investorsincentives to renance the SIV.
Second, Lemma 5 reveals, that the ability to renance the ABCP programs is linked across the
programs. The interconnectedness arises since the ABCP programs are invested into the same risky
assets. A failure to renance one ABCP program creates an externality as it leads to a re-sale of
the assets held in that program. This re-sale depresses the market price of the risky assets, and
decreases (weakly) the expected return on ABCP issued by all other ABCP programs.19 In turn,
this reduces the investorsincentives to renance other ABCP programs and may cause additional
failures and re-sales. In a contagious fashion, the failure of one ABCP program can start a chain
reaction which leads to the failure of other ABCP programs and further re-sales of the risky assets.
Given the simple structure of the risky assets and the returns on the banksoperations, expres-
sions for rcp
 
i;

and i; can be derived. These are listed in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 The lowest value of i at which the short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by
bank i is given by,
i; =
1

ln
 
exp (  ( rA  ")) + exp (  ( rA+ ")) + exp (  (rA  "))
4 exp ( IA)  exp    I + rcpA
!
  A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij , (6)
where,
P u;ij = 1  2j

S    1 G  i0NAn

, (7)
and,
rcp  rcp
 
i;

= r +
"
A
. (8)
The results in Lemma 6 originates from Lemma 4 and 5 combined with the observation that the
short-term investors renance the SIV when they are indi¤erent between investing in ABCP and
in the risk-free alternative.
Expression (7) captures the contagion e¤ect. By Lemma 5, all banks with less capital than
bank i liquidate their ABCP programs simultaneous with bank i. Thus, if bank i is the marginal
bank to unwind its ABCP program, the price at which it can liquidate the risky assets reects the
liquidation of all the ABCP programs sponsored by banks with less capital than bank i.
19Recall from the previous discussion that when the SIV is renanced under the facility, the repayment to ABCP investors
is increasing in the market price of the risky assets.
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Let
T = argmin
i
i0   i;,
and let T  =

iji0 < T0
	
. The shocks to the bankscapital are uniform, so bank T is the rst
bank to liquidate its ABCP program, and T  is the set of banks which, by Lemma 5, liquidate
their ABCP programs simultaneously with bank T . When it > 
i;, the interest rate on the ABCP
is set to maximize the payments to the bank under the swap agreement. Thus, ricp;t is the lowest
interest rate which ensures that the short-term investors renance the ABCP program. Lemma 7
exploits this indi¤erence condition to derive ricp;t.
Lemma 7 At time t, the interest rate on the ABCP issued by the SIV sponsored by bank i is given
by,
ricp;t =
1
A
ln

Pr

kt

  1
A
ln fexp ( IA)
 
h
1  Pr

kt
i
exp
24 
0@it + An
n 1X
j=0
P u;kj
1A35Et hexp (  (~rtA+ ~"t)) jit; kt+1 < k;i
9=;  I,
where Pr
 
kt
  Pr  kt+1  k; and,
k =

i for i =2 T 
T for i 2 T  .
The expressions for Pr
 
kt

and Et

exp (  (rtA+ ~"t)) jit; kt+1 < k;

are unimportant for the
models qualitative conclusions and are listed in the appendix.
The contagion e¤ect splits the set of banks into two. The rst set of banks, i 2 T , liquidate
their ABCP programs when bank T breaches its capital threshold. The interest rate on these
programs therefore depends on the sponsoring bankscapital and on the probability that bank T
breaches its capital threshold. Note that the interest rate on these ABCP programs can exceed
rcp. This follows since the expected return on ABCP is increasing in 
i
t. When 
T
t = 
T;, the
short-term investors are indi¤erent between renancing the SIV sponsored by bank T or investing
in the risk-free asset. Since Tt > 
i
t for i 2 T , banks in set T  must o¤er a higher interest rate
than bank T for any realisation of Tt .
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The banks outside T  liquidate their ABCP programs when they breach their capital threshold.
Consequently, the interest rate on these programs reects the capital of the sponsoring bank and
the probability that this capital falls short of the threshold.
Equipped with the insights of Lemma 4, 5 and 7, I present the main result of the paper. Propo-
sition 8 characterises the short-term investorsequilibrium behaviour, and outlines the conditions
under which the ABCP programs are renanced. Proposition 8 combines the insights of the pre-
vious lemmas illustrates how a small shock to one banks stock of capital can trigger an unwind of
the banksABCP program which, through the subsequent re-sales, can be amplied and spread
across the nancial system.
Proposition 8 Short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by bank i if and only if it  i;
and lt  l; and ricp;t  it   i; + r + "A for all i; l such that i0  l0.
Proposition 8 provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for short-term investors to re-
nance the ABCP programs. As in Lemma 5, Proposition 8 shows that contagion occurs across the
ABCP programs, and that the resilience of the programs is increasing in the sponsoring banks
stock of capital. Further, as in Lemma 4, the key determinant of the viability of the ABCP pro-
gram is the sponsoring banks stock of capital. Thus, a failure to renance the ABCP program
can occur without a deterioration of the credit quality of the assets held in the program. The
logic behind these insights is equivalent to the logic behind Lemma 4 and 5. The nal condition of
the proposition ensures, that when the sponsoring bank is not the marginal bank to liquidate its
ABCP program, its stock of capital is su¢ cient for the SIV to pay an interest rate which renders
short-term investors indi¤erent between investing in the ABCP and in the risk-free alternative.
Even though the risky assets are perfectly correlated, the binary structure of ~rt and ~"t implies
that there is a level of it such that r
i
cp;t = 0.
20 This illustrates, that when the sponsoring banks
stock of capital is su¢ ciently high, the risk neutral bank completely absorbs the risk of the assets
held by the SIV. By reducing the risk held by the risk averse investors, the ABCP program enhances
risk sharing. Further, since the market price of the risky assets incorporates a risk premium, the
20To see this, note that Tt > 
T; + rA+ " implies that P
 
it

= 1 for all i and therefore ricp;t = 0.
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risk neutral banks are able to acquire the risk of the assets at a discount to the expected return
on the assets. Therefore, the banks obtain positive expected prots from sponsoring the ABCP
programs. This observation is veried in Lemma 9, which illustrates why the ABCP programs arise
endogenously in equilibrium.
Lemma 9 Let icp;t and 
i
t be bank is prots at time t respectively with and without the ABCP
program. Then,
1P
s=1
Et
 
icp;t+s

>
1P
s=1
Et
 
it+s

= 0.
The model has no bankruptcy costs, so, given that the banksoperations provide them with an
expected return of zero, the banks are willing to launch ABCP programs when these yield positive
expected prots. The ABCP programs increase the banksprobability of bankruptcy, i; > 0, so
when bankruptcy is costly, there is a lower limit on the protability of the ABCP program below
which the banks refrain from initiating the programs.
The crucial element of the ABCP program is, that the banks are not required to hold capital
against the facilities. Thereby, the ABCP program allows the banks to take exposure to risky assets
which they cannot protably hold on their balance sheet. In the model, the term structure of interest
rates is at, so the protability of the ABCP program does not benet from the implicit maturity
transformation of the assets held in the ABCP program. In fact, the maturity transformation, i.e.
the nance of a long-term asset with short-term liabilities, is a tool the banks employ to reduce the
risk of the ABCP.
5 Interbank market
The insights from the previous section has important implications for the interbank market. Banks
which are forced to renance their ABCP program under the facility are pushed into bankruptcy,
so one should expect creditors in the interbank market to be wary about extending loans to banks
with low levels of capital across ABCP roll dates, but less wary about extending short-term credit
(over-night credit). This suggests, that when the banksstock of capital is low, concerns about the
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ability to renance the ABCP programs may cause a seizure of the interbank market. This seizure
prevails for loans which mature post the ABCP roll date, but it does not a¤ect the market for
short-term credit. Consequently, banks can be "awash" with liquidity and at the same time refuse
to extend credit in the interbank market with a tenure signicantly exceeding one day.21
To formalise this idea, I introduce an interbank market where nancial institutions can lend and
borrow unsecured. Generally, the existence of the interbank markets is motivated by the occurrence
of liquidity shocks.22 To keep the analysis simple, I refrain from modelling the origin of the liquidity
shocks, but assume that banks with ABCP programs, at the midpoint of each period, can be hit by
a liquidity shock which lasts either 12 or 1 period.
23 The shocks are heterogeneous across the banks
and observable to all agents. Shocks which last 12 period are reversed prior to the renancing of the
SIVs. In addition to the banks with ABCP programs, I assume that there is a set of risk neutral
nancial intermediaries without ABCP programs which supply liquidity in the interbank market. If
banks fail to raise liquidity in the interbank market, they can obtain liquidity from a lender of last
resort. The lender of last resort provides liquidity only to banks which have failed to raise liquidity
in the market, but which are solvent at the time when they apply for credit. Further, I assume that
the banks observe ~rt simultaneously with the liquidity shock. This assumption leads to a tiering of
the interbank market, as it allows creditors to distinguish the banks which are certain to be pushed
into bankruptcy on the ABCP roll date from the banks which have a positive probability of being
solvent post the ABCP roll date.
The interbank market is open every half period, i.e. at t 2 12 ; 1; 32 ; 2; :::	, and the tenure of the
interbank loans match the tenure of the liquidity shocks. To keep the analysis simple, I assume
that bank is cost of borrowing in the interbank market is included as part of the random variable
21One of the major British banks, Barclays, stated that it was "awash with cash" at the height of the seizure of the interbank
markets. See Goodhart (2007).
22See for example Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) or Allen and Gale (2000) for a rationale for the existence of interbank
markets.
23The liquidity shocks represents unforseen mismatches between the banks cash ows. They have no e¤ect on the banks
solvency, as the cash outow at time t  1
2
is o¤set by a non-risky cash inow at time t (or time t+ 1
2
). If the bank is bankrupt
at the time of the cash inow, this accrues to the banks creditors.
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~"t.24 Consequently, the dynamics of the banksequity remains as in (4). To introduce credit risk,
I assume that the banks are subject to a bankruptcy cost of C which is incurred by the banks
creditors.
The liquidity shocks and the interbank market do not a¤ect the dynamics of the bankscapital,
so short-term investorsoptimal behaviour is given by the trigger strategy outlined in Proposition
8.25
Banks which are hit by liquidity shocks apply for loans in the interbank market. In the following,
I refer to loans (and liquidity shocks) with a tenure of 12 period as short-term loans (shocks) and
to loans (shocks) with a tenure of 1 period as long-term loans (shocks).
Lemma 10 Following a shock at time t  12 , banks which are exposed to short-term liquidity shocks
obtain credit in the interbank market at the risk-free rate. Banks which are exposed to long-term
liquidity shocks obtain credit in the interbank market if and only if,
t 1 > i;  
 
rt   ricp;t 1

A  ": (9)
Banks which are exposed to long-term liquidity shocks, but which fail to meet condition (9) cannot
raise nance in the interbank market and obtain credit from the lender of last resort.
Lemma 10 illustrates, that banks which realize short-term liquidity shocks obtain credit in the
interbank market irrespective of their stock of capital. This follows, since the short-term liquidity
shocks and the short-term loans mature prior to the renancing of the SIVs, so short-term credit
is risk-free.
Absence of arbitrage between short-term and long-term loan contracts ensures, that the banks
which are exposed to long-term liquidity shocks apply for one period loans in the interbank market.
These loans mature post the renancing of the SIV, so the bank may be pushed into bankruptcy
prior to the repayment of the loan. The interbank creditors can observe the realisation of the
24The costs of borrowing in the interbank market are small when the liquidity shock is small. Thus, this assumption is
equivalent to assuming that the liquidity shocks are small relative to the other shocks that a¤ects the banksoperations.
25The bankruptcy cost a¤ects the expression for the capital threshold, i;, but it does not a¤ect the structure of the
short-term investorsequilibrium strategy.
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variable ~rt, and therefore they can single out loan applicants which are certain to be bankrupt
given the realisation of ~rt. Condition (9) separates the banks which are certain to be bankrupt
at the maturity of the long-term loan from the banks which have a positive probability of being
solvent at the maturity of the long-term loan. The bankruptcy cost exposes the interbank creditors
to losses when the borrower is insolvent at the maturity of the loan, so banks which fail to meet
condition (9) cannot obtain nance in the interbank market. At the time of the shock all banks have
a positive stock of capital and therefore they comply with the minimum capital requirements.26
Thus, banks which fail to raise nance in the interbank market are eligible for credit from the
lender of last resort.
6 Policy responses
In this section, I use the model developed above to analyse the monetary authorities and the
private sectors responses to the unravelling of the ABCP market and the seizure of the interbank
markets. To illustrate the di¤erent impact of the various responses, I initiate this section with a
discussion of the role lled by the interbank markets and a brief outline of the responses of the
di¤erent parties.
Traditionally, the monetary authorities use the discount rate and the open market operations
to ensure that the aggregate amount of liquidity in the nancial system is su¢ cient for nancial
intermediaries to settle their transactions and make payments. Only a limited number of banks have
access to the central banksopen market operations (the "primary dealers"), and the central banks
rely on a competitive market mechanism to ensure an e¢ cient distribution of the liquidity across
the nancial system. This mechanism is the interbank market. Hence, when the interbank market
freezes, the banks outside the primary dealers end up with too little liquidity to make payments
and settle trades. This raises a systemic threat to the entire nancial system. It is important to
recognize, that a seizure of the interbank market is a problem of the distribution of liquidity, and
26When the banks stock of capital is positive, they can always comply with the minimum capital requirements by reducing
the scale of their operations and returning deposits to the depositors.
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not a problem of amount of liquidity available in the nancial system as a whole.27
The monetary authorities responses to the seizure of the interbank markets can be broadly
split into two categories. The rst, traditional monetary policy, led to dramatic reductions in the
policy rates and massive liquidity injections. From September 2007 to December 2008 the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York reduced its policy rate by from 5.25% to 0%, and from September 2008
to December 2008, the size of the Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorks balance sheet doubled as a
result of unsterilized intervention in the nancial markets.28
The second category, "targeted liquidity measures", led to the introduction of a series of facilities
and to a widening of the range of assets eligible as collateral under the open market operations.
In the discussion below, I focus on the most important, the "Term Auction Facility" (TAF), the
"Term Securities Lending Facility" (TSLF) and the "ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Facility"
(ABCPMMF). Lastly, the discussion touches briey on the recapitalisation program, the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), launched by the US Treasury.
In December 2007, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York opened the TAF under which com-
mercial banks are allowed to repo securities in return for liquidity. Relative to the open market
operations which have a short tenure (no more than 14 days), the repo transactions under the
TAF have a tenure of 28 days.29 The TAF distributes liquidity more widely than the open market
operations, as the array of banks with access to liquidity under the TAF exceeds the group of
primary dealers. The TAF is structured to a¤ect the tenure of the liquidity provided by the central
bank but not the aggregate amount of liquidity in the nancial system. To meet this objective, the
central bank takes the amount of liquidity distributed under the TAF into consideration when it
xes the amount of liquidity to be supplied under the open market operations.
In addition to the TAF, in March 2008 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York opened the
27This does not rule out the co-existence of the two problems, i.e. too little aggregate liquidity and an ine¢ cient distribution
of the liquidity. However, the important point is, that since the two problems are distinct, the resolution the problems require
di¤erent economic policies.
28Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
29On July 31, 2008, the tenure of the liquidity supplied under the TAF was increased as the central banks announced that
25% of loans were allowed to have a tenure of 84 days (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
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TSLF, under which commercial banks can repo structured and illiquid securities in exchange for
government bonds. The TSLF is available to the primary dealers, and the tenure of the repo
transactions is 28 days. The TSLF provides the largest banks with excess demand for liquidity
with an alternative to a re-sale of illiquid assets.
The central bank added the ABCPMMF facility to its arsenal of liquidity measures in September
2008. Under this facility, the central bank acquirers ABCP directly from the commercial banks.
The price the central bank pays for the ABCP is equal to the price that the banks paid to acquire
the ABCP from the SIV. The ABCPMMF facility is di¤erent to the other repo facilities, as the
central bank underwrites the risk of the ABCP.30
Both the TAF, the TSLF and the ABCPMMF facilities were designed to be temporary, but
the tenure of the TAF and the TSLF has been extended suggesting that they may become more
permanent features of the nancial architecture.31
Last, in October 2008 Congress approved the USD 700bn TARP program. The initial objective
of the program was to purchase risky assets from the commercial banks at the market clearing
price. As the program was put into e¤ect however, the funds were employed to recapitalise the
banking system.
The private sectors main initiative was the attempt to establish a "super fund" (or a "super
SIV"). The idea behind the super fund was to create a SIV that could acquire the assets from the
individual ABCP programs as these were forced into liquidation. The super fund was intended to
limit the re-sales of the risky assets in order to contain the externality through which the unwind
of one ABCP program led to the liquidation of other ABCP programs. The proposed structure of
the super fund was akin to the structure of the individual ABCP programs, with the important
di¤erence that the super fund was to be sponsored by a syndicate of Wall Street banks.32 The
30To circumvent regulation that prevents federal reserve banks from purchasing assets, the MMABCP facility is structured
as a loan facility. The federal reserve banks claim to repayment is limited to the ABCP pledged under the facility, so for all
economic purposes the facility is akin to an outright purchase.
31See Taylor and Williams (2008) and Brunnermeier (2008) for further discussions of the TAF and the TSLF.
32The proposed size of the superfund was USD 400bn with Wall Street banks extending USD 100bn in credit lines (Financial
Times 07/12/07).
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super fund failed to materialize in early 2008 as the banks in the consortium one by one declined
to provide the necessary credit and liquidity lines.
6.1 Monetary authoritiesresponse
Casual empirics indicate, that traditional monetary policy has had a limited impact on the state
of the interbank market, but that the targeted liquidity measures have been more succesful. In
the model, the central banks can only alleviate the seizure of the interbank market by eliminating
the cause of the seizure, that is by bringing the unravelling of the ABCP market to a halt. In the
subsequent, I argue that traditional monetary policy is unlikely to achieve this objective, but that
targeted liquidity measures, when structured correctly, can be successful.
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the bottleneck in the interbank market arises
out of concern about counterparty risk and not due to liquidity shortages. In the model, liquidity
is plentiful and all banks can obtain short-term credit through the interbank market. The liquidity
shortage arises when the banks try to smooth liquidity shocks which stretch across the date at
which their ABCP programs must be renanced. The model predicts, that the interbank market
is tiered such that banks with high levels of capital relative to the size of their ABCP program
maintain access to the interbank market, and banks with low levels of capital relative to the size
of their ABCP programs loose access to interbank nance.
In the model, traditional monetary policy a¤ects only the amount of short-term liquidity, which
is already abundant. Since it does not a¤ect the dynamics of the ABCP market, it is futile in
alleviating the seizure of the interbank market. One channel through which traditional monetary
policy could a¤ect the state of the interbank market, and which has been suppressed in the model,
is if it a¤ects the dynamics of the sponsoring bankscapital, i.e. (4). One can argue, that a change
in the policy interest rates may a¤ect the dynamics of the sponsoring bankscapital, however, it is
questionable whether an increase in the aggregate amount of liquidity a¤ects the dynamics of the
bankscapital in a nancial system where liquidity is already abundant.
The targeted liquidity measures go to the heart of the models friction. First, in contrast with
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the open market operations, the TAF and the TSLF address the long-term liquidity shock which
is the nub of the liquidity shortage. Second, and more important, under the TAF and the TSLF,
the central banks accept a broader range of collateral. In the model, the banksvulnerability arises
because it is ine¢ cient for them to hold the risky assets on their balance sheets. When the banks
are forced to provide liquidity to their SIVs, this leads to a re-sale of the risky assets and the
subsequent price fall forces the banks into bankruptcy. By accepting a broader range of collateral,
the central banks o¤er the commercial banks an alternative to the re-sale. By pledging the risky
assets to the central bank under the TAF or the TSLF, the sponsoring bank can obtain liquidity
without selling the assets. To compensate the central banks for the counterparty risk, the banks are
required to post collateral in excess of the amount of liquidity they obtain. If the amount of excess
collateral is su¢ ciently low, the liquidity provided by the central bank is adequate for the banks
to meet their obligations to the SIV and therefore the bankruptcy of the sponsoring bank can be
avoided. In turn, this reduces the ABCP investorsincentives to withdraw from the SIV, and halts
the unravelling of the ABCP market. Thus, when structured correctly, the mere announcement of
the targeted liquidity measures is su¢ cient to alleviate the unravelling of the ABCP market, and
it should therefore not be necessary for the commercial banks to make use of the facilities.33,34
For the TAF and the TSLF to prevent the unravelling of the ABCP market, it is necessary that
the banks obtain more liquidity by pledging the assets to the central bank than by selling them in
the market.35 If this condition is not fullled, the TAF and the TSLF fail to complement the banks
ability to raise liquidity, and therefore fail to prevent the unravelling of the ABCP market. Thus,
for the TAF and the TSLF to be e¢ cient, it is a prerequisite that the central bank is willing to
accept a losses if it is forced to liquidate the collateral. Given the systemic threat of the unravelling
of the ABCP market and the central banks ability to carry the risky assets until maturity, the
33Clearly, as new shocks hit the banks balance sheets, the stock of capital may deteriorate further and the central banks may
be required to honour their commitments under the TAF and the TSLF.
34Although in theory the mere announcement of contingency policies may be enough to calm nancial markets, the recent
experiences with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prompts caution in overempahsizing the the importance of announcement e¤ects.
35 If the central bank supplies more liquidity against the risky assets than the banks could have raised in the market, the
targeted liquidity measures are equivelent to an increase of Pu;ij in the model. This reduces 
i; and lead to greater resilience
of the ABCP programs.
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central bank may prefer the collateral risk to the systemic risk.36
The ABCPMMF facility is a more forceful tool to stop the unravelling of the ABCP market. In
essence, under this facility the central bank undertakes the role of the ABCP investor. By becoming
the "ABCP investor of last resort", the central bank prevents the unwinding of the ABCP programs
and halts the re-sale of the risky assets.
Finally, the implementation of targeted liquidity measures which expose the central bank to the
risk of the collateral raises important moral hazard questions. In particular, the central banks
willingness to accept collateral risk creates incentives for the sponsoring banks to increase the size
of their ABCP programs. In the model, the size of the ABCP programs is xed exogenously, so a
detailed discussion of this question falls outside the scope of this paper.
In both its initial and its modied form, the TARP can halt the unravelling of the ABCP
market. In its initial form, the TARP reduces the stock of risky assets held by the risk averse
investors. This reduces the risk premium, and thereby the losses incurred by the banks under the
unwind of the ABCP program. Consequently, the TARP raises the expected return on ABCP and
reduces the trigger threshold, i;.37 In the shape of a recapitalisation, the TARP corresponds to an
exogeneous increase of it. With a su¢ cient amount of funds available under the TARP, and with
an appropriate distribution of the funds, the capital of banks which are under pressure to unwind
their ABCP programs could be pushed above the unwind threshold. Whether the initial version of
the TARP or the modied version is more e¢ cient depends on the parameters of the model. From
expression (6), it follows that the TARP is more e¢ cient in its initial format if,
A
n
r2
n 1P
j=1
j  1.
36Recall, that the risky assets are priced at a discount to their expected return, so the central banks expected prots are
positive if they carry the risky assets until maturity. Whether it is optimal for the central bank to hold the risky assets until
maturity depends on their disutility of systemic risk. Indeed, the more permanent nature of the TAF and the TSLF suggests,
that the central banks disutility of a systemic risk exceeds the disutility of nancing the risky assets.
37The economic e¤ect of the TARP in its initial format corresponds to an exogenous reduction of S in expression (6).
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6.2 Super fund - one SIV to rule them all...
The objective of the super fund was to acquire the assets from the ABCP programs as these were
pushed into liquidation. To evaluate the super fund, consider a version of the model where one
SIV owns all the risky assets from the individual ABCP programs, and where the sponsoring bank
owns all the capital of the individual banks, i.e. one bank and one ABCP program. By the logic
of Lemma 4, as the sponsoring banks capital breaches a predetermined threshold, the short-term
investors switch from nancing the SIV to investing in the risk-free assets. Let the sponsoring
banks stock of capital be given by sft , then
sft =
NP
i=1
it. (10)
Substituting sft for 
i
t and P
u;sf
j for P
u;i
j in the proof of Lemma 7, it follows that the threshold
value of the sponsoring banks capital is given by sf;, where
sf; =  1

ln

4 exp ( NIA)  exp   I + rcpNA
+
1

ln [exp ( N ( rA  ")) + exp ( N (rA  ")) + exp ( N ( rA+ "))]
 NA
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;sfj , (11)
and,
P u;sfj = 1  2jS. (12)
Expression (12) illustrates, that the price changes following a liquidation of the super SIV are
more erratic than the price changes following a liquidation of a subset of the individual SIVs, i.e.
P u;sft;j  P u;it;j for all i. The intuition for this is straight forward. A liquidation of the super SIV forces
the risk averse long-term investors to absorb a larger stock of the risky assets than a liquidation of
a subset of the individual SIVs. The unwind of the super SIV therefore causes a greater expansion
of the risk premium and a more erratic price change.
For the super fund to prevent the liquidation of the ABCP programs, it is necessary that,
sft  sf;. (13)
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Inserting (10) and (11) into (13) yields,
PN
i=1 
i
t
N
  A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;sfj
  1

ln

4 exp ( NIA)  exp   I + rcpNA 1N
+
1

ln [exp ( N ( rA  ")) + exp ( N (rA  ")) + exp ( N ( rA+ "))] 1N . (14)
Expression (14) shows, that the super fund can prevent an unravelling of the ABCP market
when the banksaverage stock capital is su¢ cient to compensate the short-term investors for both
the expected losses under the ABCP program (the sum of the rst and second term), and for the
risk premium they require to accept exposure to the banksstock of capital (the third term).
If a set of banks are under pressure to liquidate their ABCP programs, the super fund can
prevent the liquidations only if a subset of the banks which are not under pressure to liquidate
their ABCP programs participate in the syndicate supporting the super SIV. Thus, for the super
fund to halt the unravelling of the ABCP market, the banks with excess capital must be willing
to cross pledge their capital to support the banks with a capital decit. Under an appropriate
distribution of the fee for the support of the super SIV, banks with surplus capital may be willing
to participate in the syndicate.
The mechanics of the super SIV closely resembles the mechanics of an insurance mechanism. By
pooling their resources, the ABCP programs of banks with a capital decit can be supported under
more adverse market conditions. Conversely, the cross pledging of capital from banks with surplus
capital to banks with a capital decit increases the vulnerability of banks with surplus capital.
Market forces caused the super fund initiative to collapse. The model suggests two potential
interpretations of this event. Either the banksaggregate capital was inadequate to prevent the
unwind of the ABCP programs already under pressure, or the fees o¤ered to the banks with surplus
capital were insu¢ cient to compensate the them for the increased vulnerability.
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7 Contagion
Only a couple of papers provide micro foundations for nancial contagion (Smith (1991), Allen
and Gale (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2005)). The mechanism explored in this paper is
inherently di¤erent to Smith (1991) and Allen and Gale (2000), but shares many of the features of
Diamond and Rajan (2005). Based on the model in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond and
Rajan illustrate, that when a banksassets are illiquid, a shock which creates a maturity mismatch
between the banksassets and liabilities can cause a systemic failure of the banking system. This
failure is not driven by panic based bank runs, and it prevails even when the aggregate amount
of liqudity that the banks can create by restructuring their assets is su¢ cient to mitigatge the
liquidity shock. In Diamond and Rajans model, ex ante there are no links between the banks, and
shocks spill from one bank to the other through a common market for liquidity. When one bank
is hit by a liquidity shock, it attempts to raise liquidity in the interbank market. The increased
demand for liquidity raises the interest rate that the bankscreditors use to value the banksassets
and liabilities. The tenure of the banksassets exceeds the tenure of their liabilities so a rise in the
interest rates has an adverse impact on the banksbalance sheet. When the scramble for liquidity
is su¢ ciently acute, the rise in the interest rate pushes the bank with the greatest asset-liability
mismatch into bankruptcy, i.e. the present value of its liabilities exceeds the present value of its
asset. Thus, the initial liquidity shortage is transformed into insolvency. The structure of Diamond
and Rajans model ensures, that the aggregate demand for liquidity rises when a banks fails. Thus,
a bank failure leads to higher interest rates and a further deterioration of the remaining banks
balance sheets. In this fahsion, a liquidity shock which pushes one bank into bankruptcy can, via
the interbank market, be transmitted to other banks and cause further insovencies.
In the model presented in this paper, ex ante there are no links between the banks. Shocks are
transmitted between banks through a common market, not for liquidity, but for the risky assets.
Rather than having an adverse impact on the asset side of the other banksbalance sheet, a bank
failure has an adverse impact on the other bankso¤ balance sheet liabilities. The net e¤ect however
is the same; a failure of one bank can push other banks into insolvency.
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Both models suggest that the interbank markets can seize when the aggregate amount of liquidity
is plentiful, albeit for di¤erent reasons. In Diamond and Rajans model, the interbank market seizes
because banks with excess liquidity obtain higher returns from employing the liquidity internally
than from lending it in the interbank market. In the model I have presented, the interbank market
seizes because the lenders are concerned about counterparty risk. The policy implications of the two
models are quite similar. First, Diamond and Rajans paper presents a real model, and therefore
traditional monetary policy is absent from their model. Their analysis suggests, that to mitigage
the systemic risk and to eliminate contagion, the central authority can impose a tax on consumers
and use the proceeds from the tax to inject liquidity into the interbank markets. In their model,
this would force the interest rates down and impair the mechanism through which shocks are
transmitted from one nancial intermediary to another. In the model I have presented, the central
(monetary) authority can lend against the risky assets. If the collateral requirements are su¢ ciently
lenient, this will halt the unravelling of the ABCP market and stop the re-sales of the risky assets.
Thus, a liquidity injection can elminate the externality that transmits shocks across the nancial
system. One notable di¤erence between the policy implications is, that in Diamond and Rajans
model the liquidity injection does not expose the central authority to risk, whereas in the model I
have presented, and integral element of the liquidity injection is that the central bank must take
risk.
Diamond and Rajan consider a recapitalisation as a tool to alleviate the contagion. Given the
real nature of Diamond and Rajans model, the recapitalisation is essentially a transfer of capital
from solvent to insolvent banks. By increasing the capital of the insolvent banks, this mechanism
can prevent bank failures and contagion. In the model I have presented, this type of recapitalisation
is equivalent to the mechanism behind the super fund. When the aggregate capital in the nancial
system is su¢ cient to support the aggregate amount of ABCP outstanding, a pooling of the banks
ressources can halt the unravelling of the ABCP market and eliminate contagion.
Last, a crucial ingredient for the contagion mechanism in Diamond and Rajans model is that it
is optimal for the depositors to run a bank when the present value of its assets exceeds its liabilities.
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This feature requires the absence of a deposit insurance scheme. In the model I have presented,
deposits are insured but the run on the bank is by ABCP investors which are not entitled to
compensation if the bank defaults on its claims.
8 Conclusion
The past decades have seen sweeping changes of banksbusiness model. Banks have moved from
being simple entities that take deposits and give loans to become vehicles for origination and trans-
formation of risk. In parallel, capital markets have become increasingly heterogeneous as a wide
range of players with di¤erent investment objectives have entered the markets (hedge funds, pension
and insurance funds, private equity funds etc.). The developments in information technology has
increased computational power, and allowed the implementation of ever more sophisticated deriv-
ative programs and risk management models. This paper has provided one rationale for the rise of
capital market banks; banks which exploit derivative programs to take advantage of ine¢ ciencies
arising from the regulatory framework, the heterogeneity of the agents in the nancial markets and
the pooling of risks inherent in nancial securities.
Motivated by the seizure of the interbank markets during 2007 and 2008, and the simultane-
ous unravelling of the ABCP market, this paper has illustrated how banks can exploit complex
derivative programs to overcome ine¢ ciencies arising from nancial regulation. In particular, I
have argued that ABCP programs have emerged to overcome ine¢ cient risk sharing created by
the capital adequacy requirements. The model has highlighted how the risk transformation of the
derivative programs can amplify small shocks to the banks capital and create systemic risks for the
nancial system.
Modern banksbusiness model create novel challenges for the nancial regulator, as the risk
from the derivative programs is frequently moved o¤ the banks balance sheets and appear only as a
couple of seemingly simple derivative contracts. In the case of the ABCP program, the simple short-
term derivative contracts cover a complex structure where the e¤ective maturity of the contracts
exceed the stated maturity. The "arbitrage" in the ABCP program exploits the rules based nature
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of nancial regulation, as the program leans heavily on the one year rule for undrawn committed
credit and liquidity lines.
Although the current regulatory regime allows nancial intermediaries to accumulate o¤ balance
sheet exposures without a regulatory capital requirement, the theoretical analysis does not conclude
that the regulatory structure is ine¢ cient. Indeed, it may well be that the current nancial regula-
tion is constrained e¢ cient. As illustrated in the model, the ABCP programs arise in response to
ine¢ cient risk sharing. Evaluation of the desirability of o¤ balance sheet vehicles requires a careful
analysis of the trade o¤ between systemic risk and e¢ cient risk sharing. The framework I have
presented does not a allow for this analysis, since it does not quantify the private and social cost
of bankruptcies of nancial intermediaries.
The theoretical analysis, has underscored the importance of tracking the nancial intermediaries
o¤ balance sheet exposures. The crisis of 2007 and 2008 has revealed several examples, most
prominently among the German landesbanks, of banks whose outstanding ABCP programs were
multiples times the size of their balance sheet. Further, the model suggests that the regulator must
pay close attention to the banksstock of capital relative to their o¤ balance sheet exposures. Small
shocks to the bankscapital, such as the deterioration in the conditions of US subprime mortgage
market, can have a disproportionate e¤ect on the banks ability to support their o¤ balance sheet
vehicles. The subsequent consolidation of the o¤ balance sheet exposures can magnify the impact
of the initial shock.
The analysis has contributed to the discussion about the importance of capital and liquidity for
the seizure of the interbank market. The model presented here emphasizes that the two concepts
are fundamentally intertwined.38 Banks with abundant capital maintains access to liquidity in the
interbank market whereas banks with insu¢ cient capital fall victim to worries about counterparty
risk and loose access to interbank credit. Based on this insight, it is clear that the monetary
authoritiesearly attempts to alleviate the seizure of the interbank markets through injection of
liquidity and a reduction in policy interest rates were destined to fail.
38See Goodhart (2007) for a related argument.
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The model presented in this paper attempts to provide a motivation for the change in the
banksbusiness models, and to illustrate how these changes a¤ect the systemic risk of the nancial
markets. The model ignores many issues which have been at the forefront of the nancial turmoil
during 2007 and 2008. The most prominent of these is the information imperfections created by
the o¤ balance sheet vehicles. This is a serious shortcoming of the theoretical framework, but the
model highlights that even without this friction, the rise of capital market banks creates important
new challenges for the nancial system.
An interesting topic for future research is to develop further the understanding the banksrole
as nancial intermediaries in a capital market with heterogeneous agents. Given banksincreasing
reliance on derivative programs, it appears that modern banks to a greater extent exploit the ability
to transform risk and redistribute it, than their ability to maintain large static loan portfolios. This
development presents new and non-trivial challenges for the nancial regulator and the monetary
authorities. Further, research into how the capital market banks a¤ects the monetary transmission
mechanism could provide important insights into how monetary shocks a¤ect the modern nancial
system.
Last, the model presented in this paper takes a reduced form approach to the banksbalance
sheet. Important new insights could be obtained from a more careful modelling of the tools the
banksuse to manage their balance sheets.
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9 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1. Consider an investor with a remaining life of n periods. If the investor invests
$1 in the risky asset with n periods to maturity, and holds investment until the maturity of the
asset, he obtains a return of,
1 +
nP
=1
~rt+ = 1 + n
nP
=1
~rt+
n
 ~Rn.
From the central limit theorem,
~Rn a N
 
1; nr2

:
Let P In be the price of the risky asset with n periods until maturity if the investor is required to
hold the asset until maturity. Let Xn be the investorsdemand for the risky asset with n periods
if he is required to hold the asset until maturity. Since Wt = 0 and rI = 0,
Wt+n =
h
~Rn   P Ij
i
Xn,
and therefore,
Wt+n a N

Xn
 
1  P Ij

; n (Xn)
2 r2

.
The investor maximizes expected utility, so his optimization problem is,
max
Xn
  exp

 

Xn
 
1  P In
  1
2
n (Xn)
2 r2

= max
Xn
Xn
 
1  P In
  1
2
n (Xn)
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The rst order condition is
Xn =
1  P In
nr2
,
and by market clearing,
1  P In
nr2
= S,
so
P In = 1  2nS,
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where 2j = jr
2. Thus, if the investor has the option to sell the asset prior to maturity, P In  P In .
A parallel argument illustrates that the investor is required to hold his position in the asset until
maturity, he will short the asset if P In  P In . Thus, equilibrium requires P It = P It . n is large, so a
similar argument implies that,
P In 1 = 1  2n 1S.
To price the asset with one period to maturity, P I1 , consider the strategy of purchasing the asset
with one period to maturity at time t, and the asset with n  1 periods to maturity at time t+ 1.
This strategy yields the cash ows,
1 + ~r1 + 1 +
nP
t=2
~r = 1 + ~Rn.
The investment opportunity set is constant, so the price of an asset with j periods to maturity has
the same price independently of whether it is purchased at time t or time t+ 1. Thus, absence of
arbitrage requires,
P I1 + P
I
n 1 = 1 + P
I
n ,
so,
P I1 = 1 + P
I
n   P In 1 = 1  r2S.
To price the asset with two periods to maturity, note that the strategy of investing in the asset
with two periods to maturity at time t, and the asset with n  1 periods to maturity at time t+ 2
yields the cash ows,
1 + ~r1 + ~r2 +
n+1P
=3
~r = ~Rn + ~rn+1.
Due to the constant investment opportunity set, absence of arbitrage requires,
P I2 + P
I
n 1 = P
I
n + P
I
1   1,
so,
P I2 = P
I
n + P
I
1   1  Pn 1 = 1  2r2S.
Iteration of the absence of arbitrage argument for all securities with less than n   1 periods to
maturity yields,
P Ij = 1  2jS.
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This veries the claim in the lemma. Note, that from the expression for P Ij and market clearing it
follows that,
Xj = S ,
Xj =
1  P Ij
2jS
.
Proof. Lemma 3. Let P u;ij be the market price of the risky asset with j periods until maturity
if bank i is the only bank to liquidate its ABCP program. Then,
P u;ij = 1  2j

S   (N   1) A
n

:
Inserting the expression for P u;ij and P
cp
j into the expression for L yields,
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where third equation follows since 2j = jr
2. Thus, L < 0 requires
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.
Thus, liquidation of the ABCP program leads to a prot of,
L = Ar2
"
S   A
n
 
n 1P
j=0
j
n
+N
!#
< 0.
This veries the claim in the lemma.
Proof. Lemma 4. Assume that the short-term investors have renanced the ABCP programs of
N   1 banks and are deciding whether to renance the ABCP program of bank i (the superscript
is suppressed everywhere in the proof). The short-term investors equilibrium action is derived
by iterated deletion of conditionally dominated strategies. Short-term investors action at time
t is given by at 2 fCP;RFg, where CP indicates an investment in ABCP and RF indicates an
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investment in the risk-free asset. Dene Rcp;t  (1 + rcp;t). At time t, short-term investors choose
at to maximize expected utility, Et [U (t; rcp;t; at; at+1) jt], where
Et [U (t; rcp;t; CP; at+1) jt]
=
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
  exp ( Rcp;tA) for t  
 Pr (at+1 = CP jt) exp ( Rcp;tA)
 Pr (at+1 = RF jt)Et
(
exp
"
 
 
t+1 +
A
n
n 1P
j=0
P u;ij
!#
jt; at+1 = RF
)
for t 2
 
; 

  exp
 
 An
nP
j=1
pu;ij
!
for it  
,
(15)
and,
Et [U (t; rcp;t; CP; at+1) jt] = U (RF ) =   exp ( IA) .
Rcp;t  I, so if t is su¢ ciently high, at = CP is the dominant action. Dene 0 to be the lowest
value of t such that, given that at+1 = RF for all t+1, at = CP for all t  0. That is,

0  inf
n
tjEt [U (t; rcp;t; CP;RF )]  U (RF ) 8t  0
o
.
Clearly, 
0
= . The short-term investorsproblem is symmetric across time, so the observation
that at = CP is a dominant action for all rcp;t when t  0 implies that at+1 = CP is a dominant
action for all rcp;t+1 when t+1  0. Let a0t be the strategy under which at = CP if and only if
t  0, that is
a0t 

CP if t  0
RF otherwise
.
Let 
1
be the smallest value of t such that, given a0t+1, at = CP for all t  
1
. That is,

1  inf
n
tjEt

U
 
t; rcp;t; CP; a
0
t+1
  U (RF ) 8t  1o .
Recall that rcp;t  rcp (t), so the full characterisation of 1 requires determination of rcp


1

. To
this end, note the SIV is sponsored by the bank and therefore rcp;t is set to maximize the return
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on the bank subject to short-term investors renancing the SIV. Thus, rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

solves
  Pr  a0t+1 = CP jt exp ( Rcp;tA)
  Pr  a0t+1 = RF jtEt
8<:exp
24 
0@t+1 + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1A35 jt; a0t+1 = RF
9=; 
  exp ( IA) (16)
Note that rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

= 0 for t  0, so there are values of t such that rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

is non-empty.
Let  and 0 be two such values of t where  > 0, then rcp
 
0; a0t+1
  rcp  ; a0t+1. To see this, as-
sume to the contrary that rcp
 
0; a0t+1

< rcp
 
; a0t+1

and that 0 and rcp
 
0; a0t+1

fulls (16), i.e.
Et

U
 
0; rcp
 
0; a0t+1

; CP; a0t+1
  U (RF ). Since Et U  0; rcp  0; a0t+1 ; CP; a0t+1 is strictly
increasing in t, it follows that Et

U
 
; rcp
 
0; a0t+1

; CP; a0t+1

> Et

U
 
0; rcp
 
0; a0t+1

; CP; a0t+1
 
U (RF ). But if rcp
 
0; a0t+1

< rcp
 
; a0t+1

this contradicts that rcp
 
; a0t+1

is the lowest interest
rate which fulls (16) for t = .
Note that the two point distribution of ~rt and ~"t implies that rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

is discontinuous,
but that Pr
 
a0t+1 = CP jt

= Pr

t+1  0j

implies that rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

is right continuous.
The highest interest rate that the SIV can credibly promise short-term investors is given by
rmaxcp (t), where r
max
cp (t) = r +
t+"
A . This follows since rcp (t) > r
max
cp (t) implies that t+1 = 
and therefore, that the SIV is liquidated in the subsequent period. Thus, since rcp (t) is decreasing
in t, 
1
is the value of t which solves,

1
= argmax
t
rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

s:t: rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1
  rmaxcp (t) .
Note, that by construction of rcp (t), 
1
complies with the denition,

1  inf
n
tjEt

U
 
t; rcp;t; CP; a
0
t+1
  U (RF ) 8t  1o .
Existence of 
1
follows since rcp (t) is strictly decreasing and right continuous.
Given a0t+1, the dominant strategy of short-term investors at time t is given by a
1
t , where
a1t 

CP if t  1
RF otherwise
.
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Thus, the symmetry of the investors problem implies that the short-term investors dominant
action at time t + 1 is given by a1t+1. Analogous to the procedure above, 
2
is constructed such
that, given a1t+1, at = CP when t  
2
, that is

2  inf
n
tjEt

U
 
t; rcp;t; CP; a
1
t+1
  U (RF ) 8t  2o .
Note that rcp
 
t; a
1
t+1
  rcp  t; a0t+1. This implies that
argmax
t
rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1

s:t: rcp
 
t; a
0
t+1
  rmaxcp (t) ,
is no greater than
argmax
t
rcp
 
t; a
1
t+1

s:t: rcp
 
t; a
1
t+1
  rmaxcp (t) .
Consequently, 2  1  0. By reiterating this procedure, a sequence can be constructed where

0  1  :::  1.
In a similar fashion, a sequence 0,1,:::,1 can be constructed which starts from the region
where at = RF is the dominant action irrespective of rcp;t and t. In this sequence,
k  sup
n
tjEt
h
U

RF; ak 1t+1
i
> U (rcp;t) 8t < k
o
,
and,
akt 

RF if t < k
CP otherwise
.
By the logic above,
k = argmin
t
rcp

t; a
k 1
t+1

s:t: rcp

t; a
k 1
t+1

 rmaxcp (t) .
Existence of k follows since rcp () is decreasing and right continuous. Since rcp

t; a
k 1
t+1


rcp
 
t; a
k
t+1

, it follows that 0  1  :::  1.
The proof is concluded by noting that the limit of the two sequences coincides, so only one
strategy survives iterated deletion of conditionally dominated strategies. Let the limit of the two
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sequences be given by respectively 
1
and 1. By construction of 1, for  = 1, there exists an
rcp such that,
rcp = argmin rcp (t) ,
s:t: rcp (t)  rmaxcp (1) .
Thus, for  = 1, there exists an rcp such that,
rcp = argmax rcp (t) ,
s:t: rcp (t)  r (1) .
Since 0  1  :::  1, this implies that 1  1.
By construction of the sequences however, it follows that,
1  1,
since,

k  inf
n
tjEt
h
U

t; rcp;t; CP; a
k 1
t+1
i
 U (RF ) 8t  k
o
,
and,
k  sup
n
tjU (RF ) > Et
h
U

t; rcp;t; CP; a
k 1
t+1
i
8t < k
o
.
Therefore,
1 = 1  .
This proves, that the only strategy that survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies,
is the switching strategy under which investors nance the SIV sponsored by bank i if and only
if it  i;. Thus, irrespective of whether the short-term investors renance the other SIVs, a
requirement for the SIV sponsored by bank i to be renanced is it  i;.
Proof. Lemma 5. Contrary to the claim in the lemma, assume that the short-term investors
renance the SIV sponsored by bank i but not the SIV sponsored by bank l for i0 < 
l
0. Lemma
4 implies, that the SIV sponsored by bank l fails to be renanced at time t if lt < 
l;. By
construction of the switching strategy in Lemma 4, when kt = 
k; the short-term investors are
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indi¤erent between investing in the SIV sponsored by bank k or in the risk-free alternative. That
is,
  Pr

kt+1  k;jkt = k;

exp
h
 

I + rcp

k;

A
i
  Pr

kt+1 < 
k;jkt = k;

Et
8<:exp
24 
0@kt+1 + An
n 1X
j=0
P u;kj
1A35 jkt = k;, kt+1 < k;t+1
9=;
=   exp ( IA) : (17)
Conjecture that rcp
 
k;

is constant across k, and let rcp  rcp
 
k;

for all k. Lemma 6 veries
that indeed this is the case. If kt = 
k; and kt+1 < 
k;, then the bank defaults prior to making
its payments under the swap, so kt+1 = 
k
t + ~rtA+ ~"t. Inserting this into (17) implies,
  Pr

lt+1  l;jlt = l;

exp
   I + rcpA
 Pr

it+1 < 
l;jlt = l;

exp
0@l; + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;lj
1AEt nexp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jlt = l;, lt+1 < l;t+1o
=  Pr

lt+1  i;jit = i;

exp
   I + rcpA
 Pr

lt+1 < 
i;jit = i;

exp
0@i; + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1AEt nexp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jit = i;, it+1 < i;t+1o .
and therefore,
i; +
A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij = 
l; +
A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;lj . (18)
Under the assumption that short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by bank i but not the
SIV sponsored by bank l, P u;ij < P
u;l
j . Thus, (18) implies that that 
i; > l;. The shocks to the
banks capital are uniform, so i0 < 
l
0 implies that 
i
t < 
l
t. Thus, 
i
t < 
l
t < 
l; < i;, which by
Lemma 4 contradicts that the short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by bank i but not
the SIV sponsored by bank l.
Proof. Lemma 6. First note that when it = 
i;, the highest interest rate that the SIV sponsored
by bank i can credibly promise to pay on ABCP is rcp = r +
"
A . To see this, recall that
it+1 = 
i
t +

~rt   rcp
 
it

A+ ~"t, (19)
so,
Pr
 
it+1 < 
i;jit = i;

= 1,
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rcp > r +
"
A
.
To see that the SIV pays rcp to the investors, assume contrary to the claim in the lemma
that rcp
 
i;

< rcp. Then, there exists a  > 0 such that
Pr
 
i; +
 
~rt   rcp   

A+ ~"t  i:

= Pr
 
i; +
 
~rt   rcp

A+ ~"t  i:

.
Let Pr (y)  Pr  it+1  i;jit = y. Then,
  Pr

i;t

exp
    I + rcp  i;+ A
 
h
1  Pr

i;t
i
exp
0@i; + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1AEt nexp [  (~rt + ~")] jit = i;, it+1 < i;t+1o
>   exp ( IA) .
Thus, since the expected utility of renancing the SIV is strictly increasing in , there exists a it,
i;, such that i;t < 
i; and
  Pr  it+1  i;jit = i; exp    I + rcp  i;+ A
  Pr  it+1 < i;jit = i; exp
0@i; + A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1A
Et
n
exp [  (~rt + ~")] jit = i;, it+1 < i;t+1
o
=   exp ( IA) .
Consequently, short-term investors renance the SIV sponsored by bank i for i;  it < i;. This
contradicts Lemma 4. Thus, rcp
 
i;
  rcp.
Assume that rcp
 
i;

> rcp. Then by construction of rcp, Pr
 
it+1  i;jit = i;

= 0 and
investors therefore refuse to renance the SIV sponsored by bank i. This veries that rcp
 
i;

=
rcp = r +
"
A .
To determine i;, exploit that when it = 
i;, short-term investors are indi¤erent between
renancing the SIV sponsored by bank i and investing in the risk-free alternative. Thus, i; solves,
  Pr  it exp    I + rcpA
  1  Pr  itEt
8<:exp
24 
0@it+1 + An
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij
1A35 jit = i;; it+1 < i:
9=;
=   exp ( IA) . (20)
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By construction of rcp, it follows from (19) that when t = 
i;, the event t+1 < ;i occurs
if ~rt 6= r and ~"t 6= ". Therefore, Pr
 
i;

= 14 and
Et

exp
 it+1 jit = i;; it+1 < i:	
=
1
3
exp
  i; [exp (  ( rA  ")) + exp (  (rA  ")) + exp (  ( rA+ "))] . (21)
Inserting expression (21) and rcp into (20) and rearranging terms yields,
i: =
1

ln
 
exp (  ( rA  ")) + exp (  ( rA+ ")) + exp (  (rA  "))
4 exp ( IA)  exp    I + rcpA
!
  A
n
n 1X
j=0
P u;ij ;
where P u;ij is given by (7). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof. Lemma 7. Let Pr (y)  Pr  it+1  i;jit = y and let ricp;t  rcp  it. ricp;t is set to
maximize the sponsoring banks return from the ABCP program, subject to the constraint that
the short-term investors must be willing to renance the SIV. Let
k =

i for i =2 T 
T for i 2 T  .
Then, ricp;t is the lowest rate which solves,
  Pr

kt

exp
   I + ricp;tA
 
h
1  Pr

kt
i
Et
8<:exp
24 
0@it+1 + An
n 1X
j=0
P u;kj
1A35 jit; kt ; kt+1 < k;
9=;
   exp ( IA) ,
so is the lowest value such that,
ricp;t 
1
A
ln

Pr

kt

  1
A
ln fexp ( IA)
 
h
1  Pr

kt
i
exp
24 
0@it + An
n 1X
j=0
P u;kj
1A35Et hexp (  (~rtA+ ~")) jit; kt ; kt+1 < k;i
35  I.
Given the binary distribution of ~rt and ~"t, there are ve di¤erent values of Pr
 
it

.
Pr
 
it

= 1 for kt  T; + rA+ ",
Pr
 
it

=
3
4
for k; + rA+ " > kt  k;  
 
r   ricp;t

A+ ",
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Pr
 
it

=
1
2
for k;    r   ricp;tA+ " > kt  k; +  r + ricp;tA  ",
Pr
 
it

=
1
4
for k; +
 
r + ricp

A  " > kt  k;8i 2 T ,
Pr
 
it

= 0 for kt < 
k;.
ricp;t is a non-linear function of 
i
t, so a closed form solution for the thresholds which the value of
Pr
 
it

changes is not available.
Given the discrete structure of Pr
 
it

, there are three values of Et

exp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jit; t+1 < i;
	
.
Pr
 
it

=
3
4
) Et

exp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jit; t+1 < i;
	
= exp [  ( rA  ")] ,
Pr
 
it

=
1
2
) Et

exp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jit; t+1 < i;
	
=
1
2
fexp [  ( rA  ")] + exp [  (rA  ")]g ,
Pr
 
it

=
1
4
) Et

exp [  (~rtA+ ~"t)] jit; t+1 < i;
	
=
1
3
fexp [  ( rA  ")] + exp [  (rA  ")] + exp [  ( rA+ ")]g .
This completes the characterisation of the interest rate on the ABCP.
Proof. Proposition 8. The proof follows directly from the proof of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Note that Lemma 4 indicates, that there is only one strategy which survives iterated deletion of
conditionally dominated strategies. Thus, subject to the caveat in Lemma 5, in equilibrium, the
short-term investors employ the trigger strategy outlined in Lemma 5. Last, the banks which
are not the marginal bank to liquidate their ABCP program is charged an interest rate above
the interest rate of the marginal bank. Thus, to ensure that it is credible for the SIV to o¤er
this interest rate on the ABCP, it must be the case that Pr
 
lt+1  l;
  0. This requires that
lt+(r   rcp;t)A+ "  l;, which yields the condition on the interest rate listed in the proposition.
Proof. Lemma 9. Let icp;t be bank is prots at time t post the launch of the ABCP program,
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then, for all i 2 T ,
1P
s=1
Et
 
Tcp;t+sjTt

=
1P
s=1
Pr
 
Tt+s  T;jTt ;

t  T;; ::; Tt+s 1  T;
	"
A
n
P
j

P u;Tj 1   P u;Tj

+ Et
 
(~rt+s   rcp;t+s)A+ ~"t+sjTt+s  T;
#
>
"
A
n
nP
j=1

P u;Tj 1   P u;Tj
# 1P
s=1
Pr
 
Tt+s  T; + rA+ "jTt ;

t  T;; ::; Tt+s 1  T;
	
= Ar2

S  NA
n
 1P
s=1
Pr
 
Tt+1  T; + rA+ "jTt ;

t  T;; ::; Tt+s 1  T;
	
> 0,
where the inequality follows since rcp;t = 0 for Pr
 
it

= 1. Since icp;t > 
T
cp;t for all i =2 T , it
follows that all banks derive positive expected prots from the ABCP program.
Proof. Lemma 10. It is risk-free to lend to banks which are exposed to a short-term liquidity
shocks because the loans and the liquidity shocks mature prior to the renancing of the SIV.
Banks which are hit by long-term liquidity shocks at time t   12 can apply for a one period
loan or two consecutive short-term loans. Thus, following the occurrence of a long-term liquidity
shock, the bank can obtain credit in the interbank market if,
Pr
 
it  i;jt 1; rt

> 0,
Pr
 
~"t  i;   it 1   (rt   rcp;t 1)A

> 0.
This condition fails if,
i;   it 1   (rt   rcp;t 1)A > ",
it 1 > 
i;   (rt   rcp;t 1)A  ".
This is the condition listed in the lemma.
To show that the tenure of the interbank loans match the tenure of the banks liquidity shocks,
I show below that the banks are indi¤erent between two consecutive short-term loan, or one long-
term loan. Let riIb;j;t be the interest rate bank i pays for an interbank loan with a tenure of j
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periods at time t. The (gross) return on a short-term loan at time t  12 is
1 + ri
Ib; 1
2
;t  1
2

.
Short-term interbank loans mature and must be renanced prior to the short-term investorsdeci-
sion to renance the SIV. Thus, the expected (gross) return from the loan credit at time t is,
Pr
 
it  i;jt 1; ~rt
 
1 + ri
Ib; 1
2
;t

+

1  Pr  it  i;jt 1; ~rt (1  C).
The second term in this expression captures that the shock is a pure liquidity shock, and that the
losses to the interbank creditors derive solely from the bankruptcy cost. Lenders in the interbank
market are risk neutral, so
rIb; 1
2
;t  1
2
= 0,
and
ri
Ib; 1
2
;t
=
1  Pr  it  i;jt 1; rt
Pr
 
it  i;jt 1; rt
 C.
The return from extending a long-term loan at time t  12 is
Pr
 
it  i;jt 1; rt
 
1 + ri
Ib;1;t  1
2

+

1  Pr  it  i;jt 1; rt (1  C),
and therefore
ri
Ib;1;t  1
2
=

1  Pr  it  i;jt 1; rt
Pr
 
it  i;jt 1; rt
 C.
The costs of a one period loan and two consecutive short-term loans are equivalent so the borrower
is indi¤erent between the two strategies. Banks which fail to meet condition (9) are denied credit
in the interbank market.
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